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WHAT ’S “ACTIVE INTERMEDIARIES” 
 GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
JERRY KANG† 
In response to Justin Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1579 (2013). 
I. CAGE MATCHES, THE INTERNET, AND TRUST 
Suppose that I am about to engage in potentially risky activity. It might 
be bungee jumping, shopping on eBay, or sparring. Suppose further that I 
am “rational” in the standard rational choice theory sense.1 In other words, I 
always try to ensure that Benefits exceed Costs (B > C). Let’s focus on 
Costs. How might I estimate the potential Costs of my behavior?  
I certainly would consider the potential Harm of the activity. In other 
words, I would consider my subjectively determined ex ante expectation 
value2 of the Harm resulting from engaging in the activity (H). But sup-
pose further that even if Harm takes place, there may be some possibility of 
recourse. If so, I would also consider the ex post expectation value of 
 
† Professor of Law, Korea Times-Hankook Ilbo Chair in Korean American Studies and Law, 
UCLA School of Law.  
1 By “rational,” I mean very loosely that natural persons try to maximize something called 
“utility;” analogously, firms try to maximize “profit.” In invoking this model, I’m agreeing to have 
the conversation on the conceptual terrain that Professor Hurwitz implicitly stakes out, as 
evidenced by his favorable citations to works by Coase, Jensen and Meckling, Ellickson, and 
Calabresi and Melamed. See Justin Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1579, 
1600-01, 1602, 1615-18 (2013). 
2 By “expectation value,” I mean the product of the probability of the event taking place and 
its magnitude.  
15 Kang Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/30/2013 8:52 PM 
304 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 303 
receiving Recourse (R).3 In this simple model, my estimation of the Costs 
of engaging in the risky activity is Harm minus Recourse, (C = H – R). Let’s 
run through some concrete examples.  
Example 1: Light Sparring. Suppose that I am trying to decide whether to 
spar with my young daughter who’s studying taekwondo. Given my relative 
advantage in size, strength, and experience, H is extremely low. Our 
interests are also aligned since we don’t want to hurt each other. For me, 
there is almost no chance of significant injury. In such cases, I do not even 
consider what Recourse might be available—for instance, whether I could sue 
my daughter for medical bills or shame her publicly—because Harm is so low.  
Example 2: Cage Match. By contrast, suppose that I’m trying to decide 
whether to enter an amateur mixed martial arts competition. Given my 
relative disadvantage in age, size, strength, and viciousness, H is extremely 
high. Some sort of injury is very likely; even catastrophic injury is possible. 
Indeed, some of the competitors might not obey the rules. They might take 
steroids, strike to the back of the head, or not release a strangle or joint lock 
promptly upon surrender. My groin cup could fail. Or maybe the referee 
could be slow to respond and take too long to call a TKO. For all these 
reasons, Harm is very high, in which case I must consider more seriously 
my ex post expectation value of Recourse. Are there any “deep pockets” to 
go after, and could money actually make me whole if I’m paralyzed? The 
size of R suddenly matters. 
What do a rational choice model of cage matches and Professor Hurwitz’s 
analysis of the Internet have to do with one another? Not much, really, 
except for trust. Specifically, my model clarifies the relationship between 
harm and recourse in Hurwitz’s understanding of “trust,” which he defines 
as “reliance without recourse.”4 If we are rational, why would we ever trust 
in the sense of relying without recourse? One reason could be that we think 
Harm is minimal. Recall Example 1: Light Sparring. If Harm is de minimis, 
who cares whether any Recourse is available? By contrast, when H is high—
as in Example 2: Cage Match—a rational person would try to figure out what 
Recourse is available. 
According to Hurwitz’s narrative, a long, long time ago, in the era of the 
“Early Internet,” using the Internet was safe.5 People were nice and agreeable; 
networks were simple and well understood; not much was at stake.6 This 
 
3 Let’s fold the transaction costs of obtaining relief into R itself. These costs would reduce R. 
4 See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1584 (“[O]ne person trusts another when she relies on that 
other person in a way that exposes her to harm, but does so under circumstances where she has no 
recourse available should that harm come to pass.”). 
5 Id. at 1585-88. 
6 Id. 
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description sounds a lot like Example 1: Light Sparring. In other words, there 
was “trust” on the Internet because H was low. This characterization of the 
“Early Internet” sounds somewhat nostalgic, but let’s suppose that, once 
upon a time, the Internet was as Hurwitz describes. 
But now, Hurwitz claims the “brave new Internet”7 has become much 
more dangerous.8 Harm is rising, and rising fast. Interestingly, Hurwitz 
attributes this change to the rise of “active intermediaries.”9 Since H has 
risen, we, as rational beings, presumably should be much more concerned 
about R.10 And by definition, being so concerned means we no longer blindly 
trust. Using the Internet has become much more like Example 2: Cage Match.  
In this post-trust era of the Internet, Hurwitz predicts that users will try 
to contain overall Costs by reducing Harm.11 How? By opting out of active 
intermediation, which Hurwitz believes will pose its own problems.12 
Hurwitz suggests an alternative strategy. Rather than reducing H, he would 
try to increase R—not through any method as ham-fisted as comprehensive 
regulation, but by creating some sort of dynamic legal “framework” for 
private causes of action.13 
II. ACTIVE INTERMEDIARIES 
Hurwitz’s central diagnosis is that Harm is increasing because of the rise 
of active intermediaries. To evaluate this claim, we must know what he 






7 Id. at 1592. 
8 Id. at 1592-97. 
9 Id. at 1581; see also id. at 1590-92 (describing how the character of the Internet changed in 
the 1990s and characterizing the rise of active intermediaries as the “greatest technological change 
to the Internet architecture” during that period). 
10 See id. at 1585 (“As harm has become a concern, so too has the need for protection from 
that harm. Absent the availability of recourse against such harms, users must alter their behavior 
to protect against them.”). 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 1595 (arguing that “active intermediation has the potential to add substantial 
value to the Internet value chain”). 
13 Id. at 1615. 
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Intermediary. Way back in 1998, in modeling the privacy implications of 
Internet transactions, I offered the following schematic14: 
 
In this diagram, the “transacting parties” (or counterparties) are the 
Individual and the Merchant; the “transaction facilitators” are divided into 
two categories, Communications Provider and Payment Provider.15 In my view, 
these transaction facilitators are the “intermediaries” to the counterparties’ 
interaction. I offer this schematic in the hope that it will help to clarify 
Hurwitz’s use of the term “intermediary.”  
Unfortunately, Hurwitz does not provide a clean, precise definition of 
“intermediary.” We can, however, glean some clues from the following 
passages. According to Hurwitz: 
The greatest technological change to the Internet architecture during the 
1990s was the rise of active intermediaries. Every part of the Internet archi-
tecture—from the routers and switches, to the applications and services . . . —is 
increasingly interconnected. The result, and purpose, of these interconnec-
tions is to allow for active intermediation of user data. Routers no longer 
passively forward datagrams from one network interface to another; they 
decide to which interface to forward datagrams, and with what priority, 
based upon the contents, context, or even prior existing state of the packet. 
Servers no longer provide deterministic responses to client requests, but rather 
evaluate myriad data, much of which is unavailable to the client, in order to 
determine which response to provide.16 
 
14 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1223 (1998).  
15 Id. at 1224, 1232. 
16 Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1590 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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This passage suggests that “intermediaries” encompass hardware, including 
off-the-shelf networking components, such as switches and routers. They 
also apparently include software, such as applications and services. Interest-
ingly, intermediaries—as Hurwitz uses the term—needn’t be legal persons. 
An intermediary could be the WiFi router you just bought from Best Buy, 
or some huge piece of machinery, sitting in some air-conditioned building 
downtown, that is part of the Internet’s guts.17 Hurwitz doesn’t, however, 
expressly exclude legal persons, such as Internet Service Providers, from his 
definition.18 Thus, “intermediary” seems quite broad in scope.  
Two further observations: First, I’m not sure whether Hurwitz considers 
Visa—which I call a Payment Provider—an “intermediary.” Surely credit 
card firms intermediate Internet transactions, but Hurwitz might be 
interested only in those persons and things that intermediate electronic 
communications, not finances. Second, I presume that Hurwitz wishes to 
maintain a distinction between counterparties (the transacting parties) and 
intermediaries, who merely facilitate an interaction between the counterparties.  
Active. The above passage also sheds light on what it means to be “active,” 
which is to be complex (rather than stupidly and passively forwarding data-
grams as received)19 and responsive to various environmental conditions (rather 
than exhibiting slave-like obedience to user requests).20 Hurwitz continues: 
[T]he Internet architecture, which in the early Internet age allowed users to 
interact in new and positive ways, can now be turned against users in ways that 
harm them. Active intermediaries now are capable of using and manipulating 
user data in ways that were never before possible, and the danger is exacerbated 
because there is increasing incentive for data to be used in harmful ways.21 
This suggests that being “active” also means using and manipulating user 
data, behavior that is consistent with being dynamically responsive to 
environmental conditions. We are further told that “active intermediaries” 
may have incentives that differ from individual users. We normally don’t 
think of hardware as having “incentives,” but it is designed to accomplish 
certain goals, which could conflict with a user’s preferences.  
 
17 See id. at 1580-81 (“All online interactions are conducted through intermediaries—the 
routers, servers, applications, services, and switches that make up the Internet’s ‘core.’”). 
18 See, e.g., id. at 1593 n.46, 1603 n.83 (classifying certificate authorities, which are “human 
entit[ies],” as “intermediaries”).  
19 Id. at 1590. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1592 (emphasis added). 
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 Finally, Hurwitz writes: 
But as intermediaries have come to play an active role in the processing and 
transmission of data online, they also have become a vector for harming end 
users. Routers and switches, for instance, can prioritize data for certain users 
and applications. . . . Similarly, active intermediaries can collect and manipulate 
user information in ways that are entirely transparent to users.22 
This cements a particular understanding of Hurwitz’s conception of “active.”  
To summarize, Hurwitz seems to use “intermediaries” to describe things 
(software and hardware) and legal persons that somehow facilitate Internet 
communications—roughly what I call “Communications Providers.” They 
express their “active” nature by prioritizing data traffic23 (think “net neu-
trality”24) or processing user information25 (think “privacy”). Put in slightly 
tendentious terms, Hurwitz’s “active intermediary” is a thing or person that 
facilitates Internet communication by responding dynamically to the envi-
ronment in ways that (arguably) violate net neutrality and privacy. 
Having teased out what Hurwitz means by “active intermediaries,” we 
confront the next basic question: Are active intermediaries the principal 
reason that Harm is rising on the Internet? I’m not sure.  
Consider the various salient sources of increased Harm on the Internet. 
First, think of hackers, who steal personal information and wreck websites 
for economic and political gain. They can’t be viewed as “intermediaries” 
under Hurwitz’s definition because facilitating Internet interactions is neither 
their goal nor function. 
Second, think of cyberbullying, which periodically prompts hopeless teen-
agers to commit suicide and may disproportionately impact women’s physical 
and emotional well-being.26 Are mean and taunting anonymous posts on 
unmoderated bulletin boards primarily attributable to the actions of any 
“intermediary,” active or otherwise? Or are they the cruel and malicious 
deeds of posters who do not intermediate anything?27 
 
22 Id. at 1593 (emphasis added). 
23 Id. 
24 It might seem odd to bring net neutrality into the conversation, but Hurwitz does just 
that. See id. at 1581 (“[U]sers lacking the ability to seek recourse may demand that active interme-
diation not be used. Regulatory and proposed statutory responses to network neutrality and 
privacy concerns are early examples of such demands.”). 
25 See id. at 1593 (“[A]ctive intermediaries can collect and manipulate user information in 
ways that are entirely transparent to users.”). By “transparent,” Hurwitz means invisible or 
without notice to users. 
26 See Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 384-90 (2009). 
27 The same logic applies for cyberstalking. 
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Third, think of exposure to inappropriate content, be it sexual or violent. 
Sometimes such material is accessed intentionally by a curious kid in 
defiance of parental wishes; other times it is stumbled upon accidentally. In 
either case, is the easy accessibility of hardcore pornography or crush films 
really a problem caused by being “active,” in the sense of prioritizing 
delivery of certain types of Internet protocol packets or mining user data?  
Fourth, think of oversharing personal information on social media sites, 
where TMI (“Too Much Information”) is SOP (“Standard Operating 
Procedure”). If I share my drunken, naked pictures with my vast network of 
so-called “friends” and a prospective employer rejects my application 
because of these photos, was my Harm induced by active intermediaries? 
Or was it caused by Facebook—which, though part intermediary, is also at 
least as much a counterparty to the transaction—and governed by its Terms 
of Service, which I gladly (and blindly) clicked through? 
I don’t mean to strawman Hurwitz’s argument. He specifically concedes 
that harm on the Internet comes from multiple sources, including other 
users.28 But he repeatedly insists on emphasizing that active intermediaries 
“have become a vector for harming end users.”29 On the one hand, Hurwitz 
is certainly right. Of course things and persons that facilitate Internet 
communications by prioritizing user data (thereby arguably violating net 
neutrality) and mining personal data (thereby arguably violating privacy) 
can cause Harm. This claim—that net neutrality violations can cause net 
neutrality–related harms and privacy violations can cause privacy-based 
harms—is almost tautological. On the other hand, this sets far too low a bar. 
Almost anything, even a butter knife, can cause some harm. Hurwitz’s 
proposition must be that active intermediaries cause so much harm—or such 
distinctive harm relative to the harm created by all other Internet sources—
that users will notice these intermediaries and incrementally change their 
behavior, either by opting out of active intermediation specifically or out of 
the Internet altogether. To me, that result doesn’t seem likely. 
III. USER DROP OUT 
In Part II, I contested Hurwitz’s claim that active intermediaries were 
the dominant—or an especially salient—source of increasing Harm on the 
Internet. Although intermediaries no doubt contribute to this increased 
 
28 See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1592 (“Users can be harmed online through many vectors. 
The best-known concern is harm from other users.”). 
29 Id. at 1593.  
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Harm, they are not its principal drivers. Hurwitz and I do agree, however, 
that H is on the rise on the Internet. 
How will users respond? Hurwitz suggests that users eventually will 
realize that H is rising, attribute that increase to active intermediaries, and 
stop using these intermediaries30 or maybe even the Internet as a whole.31 
This decrease in demand for intermediaries’ services will, in turn, reduce 
the supply of active intermediation technologies,32 which is not entirely a 
good thing because Hurwitz sees value in intermediation’s data prioritiza-
tion and data mining.33 In other words, violating net neutrality and privacy 
is not all bad. After all, one person’s net neutrality is another person’s 
ineffective network management; one’s privacy violation is another’s 
efficient targeted marketing.34 Notice the potential inconsistency, or 
tradeoff, that Hurwitz’s analysis presents: Harm on the Internet—at least 
from an individual user’s perspective—is rising because of active intermedi-
aries, but active intermediation also produces societal Benefits. 
Consider all the links in Hurwitz’s proposed causal chain. I agree that 
users may vaguely sense that H is increasing, even though the Internet is 
also becoming more ubiquitous and routine, which decreases the perceived 
threat. Even so, do users view the danger as coming from active intermedi-
aries? When a parent thinks about making sure that his pre-teen is safe on 
the Internet, what threat preoccupies him? Is it the threat of Quality of 
Service packet prioritization that keeps him up at night and off the Internet? 
For reasons explained in Part II, I doubt that typical users will attribute 
their vague sense of rising H to “active intermediaries.”  
More importantly, regardless of users’ views toward active intermedi-
aries, there is little reason to think that users actually will stop using the 
Internet, which would likely be the only way to opt out of using active 
intermediaries that are embedded invisibly (as opposed to transparently) 
 
30 See, e.g., id. at 1581 (“First, users lacking the ability to seek recourse may demand that 
active intermediation not be used. . . . If the technology can, in users’ estimation, harm them in 
ways against which they cannot protect themselves, users will be reluctant to embrace such 
technology . . . .”); id. at 1592 (“Absent a mechanism to prevent such use—or, in the language of 
trust, ‘recourse’—we can expect users to resist active intermediation.”); id. at 1596 (“The natural 
response to these concerns is, and has been, to resist active intermediation.”). 
31 See id. at 1590-91 (“[I]t is possible, even likely, that the post-trust Internet will disabuse users of 
this predisposition [to trust impersonal interactions] over time. When the curtain is pulled back, so to 
speak, it is unclear what will replace trust in allowing users to feel confident in the network.”). 
32 Id. at 1581. 
33 See id. at 1595-96 (arguing that active intermediation technologies, such as statistical mul-
tiplexing and targeted advertising, benefit users). 
34 See Kang, supra note 14, at 1217-18 (noting that “privacy applies friction to the flow of infor-
mation,” which can hurt commerce because, presumably, “better information leads to better markets”). 
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into the communications architecture. Consider how many hacking scan-
dals and Facebook and Google privacy disasters there have been in recent 
years. And yet, users generally have not opted out.  
Perhaps users continue to use the Internet because of information 
asymmetry—that is, because they don’t know what is really going on. Or, it 
might be that Benefits still outweigh Costs, even as Costs have been 
increasing.35 Hurwitz’s Article focuses only on the cost side of the equation, 
where C = H – R. But even if Harm is increasing, the Benefits of using the 
Internet may be so great that most people simply won’t opt out. Consider 
the value of Facebook to a sociable teenager: For her, B seems infinite. No 
matter how high H (and thus C) becomes, my guess is that B > C for that 
teenager. She won’t opt out.  
Hurwitz might respond that one can stay on the Internet and still opt out 
of active intermediation. According to Hurwitz, the way to do so would be to 
protest loudly in favor of net neutrality and against privacy-invading commu-
nications technologies.36 On the one hand, I guess this is true, but on the 
other, this response betrays a certain oddness in the problem’s framing. 
Somehow, both net neutrality and privacy have been reincorporated as a 
problem of “active intermediaries.” But privacy anxiety is hardly limited to 
intermediaries. Amazon knows what you buy; Google knows what you email 
and search for; Facebook knows your life. Are these all “intermediaries” 
according to Hurwitz’s use of the term? No, they are counterparties.  
In addition, active intermediation is only loosely related to the prob-
lem of net neutrality. Suppose, for example, that the FCC had classified 
Internet access as a “telecommunications service” under Title II of the 
Communications Act.37 This would have satisfied the strongest proponents of 
net neutrality. Yet this legal classification would not have forced any radical 
change to or dumbing down of currently deployed routers, switches, 
applications, or services, which Hurwitz describes as already being “active.” 
Or consider the FCC’s recently adopted Open Internet rules, which explicitly 
permit reasonable network management practices.38 Certainly those practices 
 
35 Recall the basic analytics from the opening of my Response. If we assume that people are 
rational, Benefits of using the Internet must exceed Costs. 
36 See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1596-97 (citing the public’s response to network neutrality 
and online privacy concerns as examples of users resisting active intermediation). 
37 Instead, the FCC classified broadband cable Internet service as a Title I “information ser-
vice,” a category not subject to common-carrier regulations. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-76, 1003 (2005) (affirming the FCC’s classification). 
38 See 47 C.F.R. § 8.11(d) (2012) (“Reasonable network management. A network management 
practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management 
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would leverage the fact that intermediaries are in some sense “active,” but 
doing so would be entirely consistent with a neutral or “open” Internet.  
IV. UNDERSPECIFIED SOLUTION 
In Part II, I suggested that Hurwitz’s diagnosis is suspect (rising H is 
not driven substantially by active intermediaries). In Part III, I questioned 
whether users would defend themselves by opting out of the Internet 
generally, or active intermediation specifically. In particular, Hurwitz never 
demonstrated that, even with active intermediaries, Benefits will be subjec-
tively estimated to be lower than Costs (B < C) for most users. But suppose 
I’m mistaken on both matters. Assuming that H is rising principally or 
saliently because of active intermediaries, and assuming that users will 
respond by opting out of using either the Internet or active intermediaries, 
what’s Hurwitz’s solution? 
Recall that Cost = Harm – Recourse (C = H – R). Instead of trying to 
decrease H (by killing off active intermediation), Hurwitz wants to increase 
R. Because Hurwitz explains that vertical integration and “endogenous” 
mechanisms, such as reputation and encryption, are deeply limited,39 he 
reluctantly considers potential legal reforms to achieve this end. To be clear, 
he is no fan of comprehensive regulation. Rather, he seeks a softer, more 
dynamic “framework.” 
That framework draws on the famous work of Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed, which requires answering at least two questions: (1) Who 
should receive the initial legal entitlement, and (2) Should that entitlement 
be protected by a liability or a property rule?40 Hurwitz concludes that the 
entitlement should be granted initially to the user, and should be protected 
by a liability rule.41  
But it’s unclear how this framework applies to active intermediation in 
the form of, say, data prioritization. Suppose that I’m Verizon, which 
provides last-mile broadband Internet service to an end user. Suppose that I 
become more “active” by speeding up certain content provider video packets 
 
purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband 
Internet access service.”). 
39 See Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1608-13 (discussing the limitations of vertical integration and 
endogenous institutions). 
40 Id. at 1613-20; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972) 
(describing their model). 
41 Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1615-16. Liability rule protection permits the involuntary transfer 
of the entitlement if the buyer is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it. Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 40, at 1092. 
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because I’ve cut a deal to favor Hulu over Netflix. Applying Hurwitz’s 
framework, we have to give the initial entitlement over “user data” to the user. 
But in my hypothetical, what counts as “user data”? Does it include the bits 
that constitute the movie I’m trying to stream from Netflix? Given preexisting 
intellectual property rights, in what sense does the user hold this entitlement? 
Are we talking about some legal entitlement to packet delivery without 
prioritization? If so, why should the individual user be granted that entitle-
ment initially, considering extant background law (that Internet service is not 
common carriage)42 and the contractual Terms of Service the user assented to? 
Also, what does it mean to say that this entitlement should be protected 
by a liability rule? This suggests that Verizon must compensate me after it 
“takes” my entitlement without prior, explicit permission. Does Hurwitz’s 
framework provide me with a tort action I can launch against Verizon? 
Would Hurwitz want me to have such a tort action, considering his suggestion 
that active intermediation of this sort provides societal benefits? It’s all 
quite intriguing but frustratingly murky. 
The “entitlement-to-user and liability rule” framework makes more 
sense as applied to privacy violations by intermediaries. However, this 
framework would have essentially no impact on counterparties, such as 
Facebook, which, by definition, aren’t intermediaries. And even if Facebook 
were an intermediary, unless the entitlement is inalienable, a clickwrap 
license embedded in Facebook’s Terms of Service would allow it to do 
whatever it wants to.  
Finally, even with respect to intermediaries, Hurwitz’s justification for 
initial entitlement and liability rule protection is a bit thin. As for initial 
entitlement to the user, Hurwitz smartly points out that we shouldn’t take it 
for granted that the initial entitlement must go to the user because “the user 
has necessarily relinquished control of her data to the intermediary.”43 
However, deeper analyses of and justifications for this initial entitlement have 
appeared elsewhere in the literature.44 For example, I have demonstrated why 
initial entitlement to the user makes sense on both efficiency (applying an Ian 
Ayres–Robert Gertner default rule analysis)45 and dignity grounds.46  
 
42 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
43 Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1615.  
44 See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229, 
237-40 (2004) (exploring the initial grant of entitlement problem).  
45 See Kang, supra note 14, at 1249-�� (concluding, based on an efficiency analysis, that an 
information collector should be permitted to process personal data “only in functionally necessary 
ways,” as opposed to processing it any way it likes); Kang & Buchner, supra note 44, at 238-40 
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As for liability rule protection (versus property rule protection), I’m left 
uncertain. There is extensive literature describing the rise of new sorts of 
markets for personal information—with matchmaking technologies that 
decrease transaction costs between buyers and sellers47—in ways that could 
justify applying a property rule requiring ex ante negotiations for taking 
personal information instead of providing ex post liability protection. Hurwitz 
specifically points out that one consequence of adopting the liability rule might 
be to encourage technologies that “allow users to specify whether they want, or 
are willing to allow, their data to be subject to prioritization.”48 If this is so, why 
wouldn’t a property rule—which explicitly requires prior user authorization—
encourage even more strongly the production of such technologies? 
In addition to the Calabresi–Melamed framework, Hurwitz provides other 
specifics, suggesting, for example, that 47 U.S.C. § 23049 might have to be 
modified. Section 230 immunizes a “provider or user of an interactive 
computer service” from being deemed a “publisher or speaker” of content 
provided by “another information content provider.”50 It has been interpreted 
by courts to provide a breathtakingly broad immunity,51 and Hurwitz 
gestures toward a new regime with greater potential liability.52 But it’s not 
clear how this immunity has any application to the threat model that 
preoccupies Hurwitz.53 First, there is no one-to-one mapping between the 
statute’s “provider or user of an interactive computer service” and Hurwitz’s 
“active intermediary.” Second, according to Hurwitz, Harm on the Internet 
is increasing because of data prioritization and personal data mining, but 
neither process would tend to render the active intermediary the publisher 
 
(suggesting that “it would be most efficient to give citizens [as opposed to merchants] the property 
right in the first place”). 
46 See Kang, supra note 14, at 1259-65 (arguing that cyberspace surveillance frequently 
infringes upon the dignity of the individual user); Kang & Buchner, supra note 44, at 234-36 
(suggesting that privacy generally, and information privacy more specifically, can be viewed as a 
“fundamental human right”). 
47 See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Self-Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 809, 836-37 (2012) 
(discussing “infomediaries” (information intermediaries) that reduce the costs of matchmaking). 
48 Hurwitz, supra note 1, at 1617. 
49  47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
50 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
51 See, e.g., JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 319-
30 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012) (discussing cases that interpret 47 U.S.C. § 230, and 
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or speaker of content provided by someone else, in which case the immunity 
offered by § 230 would remain irrelevant.  
CONCLUSION 
Hurwitz should be credited for focusing our attention on the importance 
of trust on the Internet, and on what might happen as trust erodes. But his 
construct of “active intermediaries”—which entangles hard questions about 
net neutrality and privacy—fails to diagnose precisely or solve concretely 
the problem. We should care and fight about net neutrality. We should care 
and fight about privacy. What I’m less sure about is whether we should do 
so under the rubric of “active intermediaries.”  
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